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AVOIDING LAWYER LIABILITY IN THE
WAKE OF KAYE, SCHOLER
BRIAN W. SMITH* & M. LINDSAY CHILDRESS**
For better or worse, the Kaye, Scholer case heralded a new era
in the management of the relationship between law firms and fi-
nancial institution clients. The Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") brought an administrative action against Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler ("Kaye, Scholer") and three partners of
the firm individually, alleging that the law firm committed mal-
practice while representing the now infamous Lincoln Savings
and Loan Association ("Lincoln Savings") from 1984 to 1989.1
Kaye, Scholer had also represented American Continental Corpo-
ration ("ACC"), the parent of Lincoln Savings, since 1977.2
In just six days, the specter of an asset freeze, 3 and the pressure
exerted by the firm's clients and by the banks holding the firm's
lines of credit,4 made the total disintegration of a large New York
law firm seem imminent and caused the firm to settle with the
OTS for a then record-breaking $41 million.5 The settlement also
barred two of the firm's partners from any further representation
of federally insured depository institutions and restricted certain
* Mr. Smith is a partner with the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt and former Chief
Counsel to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
** Ms. Childress is an associate with the firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt.
1OTS v. Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Misc. No. 92-101 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2 Id.
3 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4) (Supp. 1994) (grants power to employ an asset freeze or "as-
set protection" as it is referred to by the OTS). This section has since been amended to
apply Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an attempt to grant due process
protection to the attachment of assets. See Pub. L. No. 204, 107 Stat. 2408 (1993).
4 See, e.g., Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AMER. LAw., May
1992, at 68, 69; Michael Orey, The Lessons of Kaye, Scholer: Am I My Partner's Keeper/Am
I My Client's Keeper?, AMER. LAw., May 1992, at 3, 81; Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas,
Legal Crisis: How a Big Firm Was Brought to its Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 13, 1992, at Al, A6; Kenneth H. Bacon, Kaye, Scholer Settles Charges in Lincoln Case,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1992, at A3, A7. It is interesting to note that the asset freeze order was
not, in the estimation of some, the sole cause of the swift settlement. Rather, it heightened
the sense of terror caused by the astronomical $275 million suit. While the freeze order was
carefully written to allow the law firm to continue to function and to utilize its lines of
credit with the banks, the banks viewed a law firm facing such a large suit as being
doomed. In effect, Kaye, Scholer had its financial feet taken out from under it.
5 See Release, OTS AP No. 92-25, at 2 (Mar. 8, 1991).
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activities of a third partner. The Attorney's Liability Assurance
Society ("ALAS"), an insurer of large law firms, stated that this
was the first instance within their knowledge where law firm
partners were required to pay a portion of the settlement because
it exceeded insurance coverage. 6
Kaye, Scholer also entered into a consent cease and desist order
which articulated the OTS's theories concerning appropriate at-
torney action during the bank examination process under certain
circumstances.7 The order requires Kaye, Scholer's banking prac-
tice group to supervise all future matters concerning financial in-
stitutions. A banking partner with ten years or more banking ex-
perience must act as the partner in charge whenever Kaye,
Scholer provides significant representation of an insured deposi-
tory institution. The order also requires Kaye, Scholer "not to
knowingly make any misrepresentations of fact or omit any mate-
rial information in communications to federal regulators on behalf
of any clients covered by federal banking laws, or to engage in any
conflicts of interest in representing such clients."8
It is questionable whether any law firm could stand up to the
intense pressure of administrative action backed by the threat of
an asset freeze. This is especially true in light of the fact that
most law firms lack liquid assets and utilize debt to fund day-to-
day operations, and rely heavily on reputation to attract busi-
ness.9 Whether one believes that Kaye, Scholer was railroaded or
acted inappropriately and unethically, the fact remains that the
case' ° signaled an end to the false sense of security most lawyers
had that the actions and activities of clients could not affect the
6 See Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Malpractice Claims in the Financial Institutions
Practice, Loss PREVENTION J., Sept. 1992, at 2, 8.
7 The argument has been made that the OTS's position with regard to Kaye, Scholer was
unique because the consent order was designed to address specific wrongdoing and should
not be considered definitive. See, e.g., Comments of the Office of Thrift Supervision on the
Report and Recommendations of the ABA Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of
Regulated Clients, 2 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Buraff) G-1, G-18 (Aug. 20, 1993) [hereinafter
OTS Statement to ABA]; Lawrence G. Baxter, Overview of Federal Regulatory Attempts at
Guidance or Control of Attorney Conduct, 534 ALI-ABA 265, 267, 270 (Dec. 10, 1993); Ar-
thur W. Leibold, Jr., Zealous Representation of Thrift Clients; Can It Exist?, 534 ALI-ABI
189, 191, 193 (Dec. 10, 1993); Steve France, Unhappy Pioneers: For S&L Lawyers, Liabil-
ity Has Displaced Ethics, 534 ALI-ABI 517, 530 & n.10 (Dec. 10, 1993).
8 See Release, OTS AP No. 92-25, at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 1991).
9 See Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, The Banking Scandal: An Era of New Stan-
dards for Professionals?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 23, 1992, at 1.
10 For an interesting, albeit highly critical, discussion concerning the actions of the
Kaye, Scholer attorneys and the internal memoranda which proved so damaging, see Beck
& Orey, supra note 4, at 69.
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law firm.
This Article intends to set forth the prevailing perceptions in
the legal profession concerning the impact of the Kaye, Scholer
case on a law firm's bank regulatory practice and to identify areas
where a firm might establish policies to provide some protection
against allegations of misconduct.
I. THEORIES OF LAWYER LIABILITY
The power which the OTS exerted over Kaye, Scholer stemmed,
in part, from the new relationship between professionals and fi-
nancial institutions forged out of the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA")."' This
statute was spawned in a political climate furious over the egre-
gious abuses of certain individuals who took over thrift institu-
tions and used them to further their own fraudulent and highly
speculative schemes.
Section 204(f)(5) of FIRREA created a new term "institution-af-
filiated party" and defined it to include independent contractors.
Attorneys are expressly included if they "knowingly or recklessly
participate in (A) any violation of any law or regulation; (B) any
breach of fiduciary duty; or (C) any unsafe or unsound practice,
which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial
loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository
institution."12 In addition, at least one commentator has pointed
out that this "independent contractor" category is expanded by the
FIRREA definition of "violation" which "includes any action (alone
or with another or others) for or toward causing, bringing about,
participating in, counseling, or aiding and abetting a violation." 3
The First Interim Report of the American Bar Association Task
Force on the Liability of Counsel Representing Depository Institu-
tions, ("ABA Task Force Exposure Draft"),14 outlines the theories
11 Pub. L. 101-73, § 909, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1989 & Supp.
1993)).
12 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (1989 & Supp. 1994). See Keith R. Fisher, Regulators Find New
Deep Pockets in Bank Counsel, BANKING L. REv., Summer 1991, at 3, 4 n.4 (discussing
definition of "institution-affiliated party" in which lawyer's actions, through participation
in conduct of affairs of institution, even in absence of knowing or reckless behavior, could
subject lawyer to liability).
13 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 5 n.7 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1813(v) (1989)) (emphasis
added).
14 KEITH R. FiSHER, THE Frosr INTERl REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON LLABILITY OF
COUNSEL REPRESENTING DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, CHAIRMAN's EXPoSuRE DRAFT, pt. IV, at
1993]
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of attorney liability articulated by the then Chief Counsel to the
OTS, Harris Weinstein. These theories have caused an increasing
level of uncertainty among both attorneys and their financial in-
stitution clients concerning the proper role of attorneys when rep-
resenting financial institutions and the continued reliability of
codes of conduct and the opinions of the courts, the state bars and
the ABA concerning the ethical conduct of attorneys. 5
The most striking of these theories is that attorneys represent-
ing financial institutions owe a fiduciary duty to the government
based on one of several alternative arguments:
The government holds a "negative equity" interest in the
financial institution because it is the holder of "potentially un-
limited equity risk" in the institution.16
The government in situations of imminent insolvency,
should be considered comparable to a creditor under bank-
ruptcy law because it is the largest single potential creditor of
an institution. 7
The government is the insurer and is therefore subrogated
to the rights of the insured.'
In addition, Mr. Weinstein also advanced the notion of an attor-
ney's duty to advise directors of a financial institution (which
clearly do have a fiduciary duty to the institution) of their fiduci-
ary duty' 9 and a duty to practice the "whole law."2" The "whole
law" concept requires an attorney to consider the essence of all
federal statutes and regulations, as well as "concepts of safety and
soundness," "concepts of fiduciary responsibility" and "'the princi-
ple that imposes hostility to law avoidance schemes.' " 2 1
Mr. Weinstein also articulated theories concerning the lessons
of the savings and loan crisis and the professional responsibility of
lawyers which drew the attention of the legal community. In a
1992 speech, Mr. Weinstein noted that an attorney should:
1-47 (1992) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE ExposuRE DRAFT].
15 Id. pt. IV, at 3.
16 Id. at 4.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 7; see Fisher, supra note 12, at 4-5 (discussing various theories of liability ex-
pounded by Mr. Weinstein).
19 ABA TASK FORCE ExPosURE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. IV, at 5.
20 Id. at 9.
21 Id. at 9-10 (quoting Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Wein-
stein Says, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 616, 617 (1991)).
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Be sensitive to the role he plays and the arena in which he
acts (a lawyer acting as adviser in a bank examination has a
different role from one acting as litigator).
Practice the whole law (rather than exploiting loopholes) by
considering the totality of the law and the underlying princi-
ples and purpose of legal restrictions.
Respond to the regulators honestly and comply with disclo-
sure and other regulations concerning submissions to the fed-
eral regulators.
When advising a fiduciary, be fully aware of the fact that
the fiduciary must act in the best interests of the financial
institution and remind the fiduciary of his duty, especially
when counselling a client in a gray area of the law.
Report any unlawful activity of an officer, director, or em-
ployee up the corporate chain of command and ultimately to
the board of directors, if necessary.
Not knowingly further the unlawful activity of a financial
institution, or its directors, or officers.22
II. WEAKNESSES OF THE LIABILITY THEORIES
The ABA Task Force Exposure Draft outlines the problems in-
herent in Mr. Weinstein's new theories of lawyer liability. The
Task Force points out that the "negative equity" theory is not
founded on prior precedent.23 An extension of that concept to the
private sector would require all corporations to conduct their busi-
ness with consideration of the best interests of their insurance
carriers, a concept which is clearly problematic.2 4 Additionally,
the interest being asserted is contingent in nature.2 5 This is also
the case with the bankruptcy creditor approach. Until an entity is
actually insolvent, the rights of a creditor are merely contingent.2 6
There is great difficulty in determining at what point an attor-
ney's duty to the creditors of an insolvent financial institution
would arise. The ABA Task Force points out that "a substantial
gray area exists in terms of defining the exact distance from the
brink where the obligation-and potential liability in an enforce-
ment action-attaches."27
22 ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. IV, at 10-11.
23 Id. at 17.
24 Id. at 17-18.
25 Id. at 19.
26 See id. at 20.
27 See ABA TASK FORCE ExposuRE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. IV, at 20.
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In addition, any theory involving the subrogation of the govern-
ment to the rights of the depositors suffers from the fact that, in
the past, the duty of an attorney to act in the best interests of the
insured financial institution and its shareholders has not ex-
tended to depositors. 28 Finally, subrogation only occurs after an
insured financial institution has failed and the depositors have
been reimbursed for their losses. At that point, the government
first succeeds to the rights of the depositors.29
The ABA Task Force also criticizes Mr. Weinstein's theory of
the "whole law," noting that the history of banking regulation is
full of instances where creative bank regulatory lawyers utilized
"loop-holes," such as the creation of "nonbank" banks, and the con-
version of banking institutions between state and federal charters
to take advantage of the special characteristics of each.30
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of these newly expounded
liability theories is the subjective nature of the duties. Such sub-
jectivity will make it very difficult for an attorney to feel secure
that he understands the duties he owes to others. In addition, the
implementation of such duties would have a profoundly chilling
effect upon the rendering of legal advice to financial institution
clients. 3 1 Attorneys would likely be unwilling to expound novel,
albeit defendable, legal theories in "gray area" matters or unusual
situations. Honest creativity may be sacrificed for an attorney's
higher comfort-level.
III. CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES AND PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS
Various attorney ethical rules are implicated in situations such
as those in the Kaye, Scholer case. Questions arise as to when an
attorney must disclose client misconduct to the board of directors
of a financial institution or to the regulators, whether an attorney
may withdraw, and whether he must do so in certain instances.
Even the method by which an attorney withdraws is open to criti-
cism. A discussion of the more relevant ethical rules follows.
28 Id. at 21.
29 Id. at 30.
30 Id. at 33-35.
31 Id. at 3.
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A. Disclosure
The possible reporting of misconduct to third parties, whether
to the directors of an institution or to the federal regulators, impli-
cates the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules"). Model Rule 1.6, concerning confidentiality and the disclo-
sure of client confidences, allows a lawyer to reveal information
relating to the representation of a client (i) after consent of the
client; (ii) when impliedly authorized to carry out the representa-
tion; (iii) to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes the dis-
closure necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm; or (iv) to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy with the client, as a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
the conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to alle-
gations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client.
The question arises as to whether an attorney with knowledge
of misconduct may inform the board of directors of the financial
institution or the regulators of such misconduct. The Model Rules
do not provide for disclosure to federal regulators in the absence of
one of the above factors. Model Rule 1.13 makes it clear that, in
corporate situations, the organization is generally the client. That
rule provides for referral by the attorney of certain activities of an
officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization
to a higher authority in the organization, if the attorney knows
that the activity or the refusal to act is a violation of a legal obliga-
tion to the organization or a violation of law which reasonably
might be imputed to the organization. However, the rule requires
the attorney to act as is reasonably necessary in the best interests
of the organization. The rule does not require disclosure to the
board of directors. In fact, the comment to the rule suggests that
such disclosure is a permissible but unusual step which the attor-
ney may take.2 The comment also notes that Model Rule 1.13
32 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1993) ('[R]eview by the chief
executive officer or by the board of directors may be required when the matter is of impor-
tance commensurate with their authority."); see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.13. The Model Rule states, in pertinent part:
In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter
to the organization's highest authority. Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or
1993]
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neither expands nor contracts a lawyer's responsibilities under
other rules, including the disclosure rules.
The current position of the OTS seems to be that, while the at-
torney may have a duty to report misconduct to the directors of a
financial institution, this duty does not extend to reporting to the
regulators absent special circumstances. 33 However, the regula-
tors have argued that Model Rule 1.13 requires the lawyer to at-
tempt to change the offending conduct by talking to the perpetra-
tor, and disclosing the problem up the chain of command to the
directors, if necessary, to remedy the misconduct.34 Both the RTC
and the OTS have taken the position that a lawyer's failure to
inform the directors of misdeeds that are occurring may be the
basis for lawyer liability.35
B. Duty Not to Assist in Fraud
Model Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer may not counsel or assist
a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. Model Rule 4.1
states that while representing a client, a lawyer must not (i) make
a false statement of material fact or law to a third person, or (ii)
fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting in the client's crime or fraud, unless
disclosure is prohibited. Commentators have noted (under the
prior version of the ABA's ethics rules, the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 7-102) that this rule should suffice to
protect the interests of the regulators in not receiving fraudulent
information through an attorney. The implication of higher ethi-
cal standards for attorneys of financial institutions is unnecessary
in these commentators' view in order to protect the regulators.
similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain
conditions highest authority reposes elsewhere; for example, in the independent direc-
tors of a corporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
33 See OTS Statement to ABA, supra note 7, at G-18 to G-20; ROBERT E. OVIALLEY ET AL.,
Financial Institutions Practice: Lawyers' Liability Issues, in ALAS Loss PREVENTION MAN-
UAL, at 5 (Feb. 1994); see also O'Malley, supra note 6, at 9; see also John L. Douglas & John
K. Train, Kaye, Scholer Case: Lessons for Banking Lawyers and Clients, 11 BANKING POLY
REP., May 4, 1992, at 1, 17 (attorneys' obligation to regulators is not to impead investiga-
tion). But see, e.g., Laborers in Different Vineyards? The Banking Regulators and the Legal
Profession, REPORT BY THE ABA WORKING GROUP ON LAwYERs' REPRESENTATION OF REGU-
LATED CLIENTS, pt. III, at 133-34 (1993) (discussing several cases with, at least, attorney
disclosing improper client conduct to regulator agency).
34 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 9.
35 Id.
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The current version of this rule should provide sufficient protec-
tion, whereas a post-Kaye, Scholer rule might be counterproduc-
tive and even unconstitutional.3
C. Withdrawal
Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires that an attorney withdraw from
representation of a client if the lawyer's services will be used by
the client and will result in a violation of the rules of professional
conduct or law.3 7 An attorney may withdraw from representation
if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect
on the interests of the client and the client continues in conduct
involving the attorney's services which the attorney reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent or has used his services in the
past to perpetrate a crime or fraud. In contrast, the OTS expects
an attorney to withdraw his representation if the disclosure to the
board of directors of the institution does not remedy the
misconduct. 8
The comment to Model Rule 1.6 on confidentiality states that
after withdrawing, a lawyer must continue to keep his client's con-
fidences, except as provided in the rules. However, a lawyer may
give notice of the fact of his withdrawal, and may also withdraw or
disaffirm any opinion, document, or similar materials. This com-
ment to Model Rule 1.6 has generated an especially interesting
debate concerning whether this so-called "noisy withdrawal" com-
ment allows an attorney, by his actions in withdrawing, to expose
a client who has or intends to use the attorney's work product to
commit a fraud. 9
D. Conflicts of Interest
Model Rules 1.7 through 1.10 concern conflicts of interest. The
general rule concerning conflicts of interest is Model Rule 1.7,
which requires client consent when a law firm intends to repre-
36 See Pitt & Johnson, supra note 9, at 7. [The authors] question whether such a broad
rule of ethical transmogrification is either appropriate or necessary. Id. The resulting addi-
tional costs for liability insurance for lawyers and quasi-judicial proceeding might violate
due process. Id.
37 See also MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6(A)(1) cmt. (1993) (concern-
ing withdrawal); MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.13(B) (1993) (in connec-
tion with organizations) (emphasis added).
38 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 9.
39 See Robert E. O'Malley, Draft on ABA Ethics, 1 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Burafl) F-1
(Feb. 5, 1993).
1993]
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sent one client in a matter directly adverse to another client, or
where the representation of a client may be materially limited by
the attorney's responsibilities to another client, a third person, or
the attorney's own interests. In either case, the attorney must
reasonably believe that the representation will not adversely af-
fect the relationship with the other client. The comment to Model
Rule 1.7 requires that a law firm adopt reasonable procedures to
determine the parties involved in both litigation and nonlitigation
matters and whether there are actual or potential conflicts of
interest.
The comment to Model Rule 1.7 also discusses the conflicts
which may arise when an attorney is also a member of the board
of directors of a client. The comment notes that the attorney could
conceivably be called upon to render advice to the corporation con-
cerning the activities of the board. The attorney should consider
the frequency of such requests, the potential extent of the conflict,
the effect of the attorney's resignation from the board, and the
possibility of the corporation obtaining independent advice from
another attorney in such instances. "If there is material risk that
the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of profes-
sional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director."40
A lawyer may also not "enter into a business transaction with a
client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or
other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless... "the trans-
action and terms are fair and reasonable, fully disclosed in writing
to the client and the client consents after reasonable time to con-
sult with other counsel.41 The comment to Model Rule 1.8 specifi-
cally excludes the normal provision of services where the lawyer
does not have special advantage. Presumably, this would be the
case in many lending situations, although as discussed below,
such interrelationship between a financial institution and a law
firm or individual law partners is not recommended.
After termination of a relationship with a client, a lawyer may
not represent another client in the same or substantially related
matter in which the interests of the two clients are materially ad-
verse, unless the former client consents. A lawyer also may not
40 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIoNAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1993) (concerning other con-
flict situations) (emphasis added).
41 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.8 (1993) (lawyers potential conflict of
interest with client may be overcome).
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represent another client in a same or substantially related matter
in which a firm with which the lawyer was formerly associated
had represented a client whose interests are materially adverse
and about whom the lawyer had acquired protected information,
unless the former client consents after consultation. A lawyer
may not use information relating to the representation of a former
client or client of his present or previous firms, unless the infor-
mation has become generally known or certain other rules permit
or require such use. A lawyer may not disclose information relat-
ing to the representation unless certain rules permit or require
such disclosure. In certain instances, the entire law firm is dis-
qualified as a result of the conflict of one partner.42
Clearly there are many instances when an unwary law firm can
fall into a conflict situation. Conflicts of interest may arise be-
tween a financial institution on the one hand and the holding com-
pany on the other. Law firms often do work for a financial institu-
tion in addition to advising the board of directors of the financial
institution concerning regulatory matters. Should this "other
work" be a problem, there may be a budding conflict of interest. In
such instances, the engagement letter should clearly outline the
various matters to be handled on behalf of the institution. Law
firms should also consider creating complete lists of the various
matters completed for a client and review this list periodically for
developing conflicts of interest.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF KAYE, SCHOLER ON LAW FIRM BANK
REGULATORY PRACTICE: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS
Careful attention to established criteria for client acceptance
and active management of the client relationship will be essential
to minimizing the potential for liability.
A. Know Your Client
The days in which a law firm should consider accepting the
business of any potential client which crosses its threshold are
gone. Potential clients may mean lucrative fees and additional
42 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.9(b) (1993) (when attorneys will
be barred from representing adverse parties of former clients of present or previous firm);
see also MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.10(b) (1993) (firm disqualified
when matter is substantially related and lawyer is privy to information).
1993]
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business, but they may also bring with them the potential for suits
against the law firm, charges of malpractice, and enormous risk.
The current liability situation suggests that the best protection for
a law firm wishing to avoid possible liability is to choose carefully
what business the law firm should accept and what business poses
too many threats to justify its engagement.
The question becomes how a law firm decides which clients have
positive potential and which will be more risk than they are
worth. A law firm now must devote time and energy to a review of
the general reputation, financial standing and the standing
among the regulators, auditors, and other lawyers of a potential
client, prior to accepting the representation.43 A law firm should
be wary of being called into a transaction in progress or without
being given adequate lead-in time.44 The appearance that the law
firm may have replaced an earlier law firm because it would agree
to do for the client what another law firm would not, will be dam-
aging whether or not true.4 5
Finally, law firms will want to continue to monitor the financial
and regulatory standing of their financial institution clients to en-
sure that they remain low-risk clients.46
B. Specify the Extent of the Representation in Writing
A law firm can further protect itself by clearly defining the spe-
cific nature and scope of its representation of each client in its en-
gagement letter.47 The letter should clearly define when the client
43 ABA TASK FORCE ExPosURE DRAr, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 3-4.
44 Id. at 11.
45 See FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that
Rogers & Wells was dismissed as counsel and replaced with O'Melveny & Myers soon after
Rogers & Wells advised bank that audited financial statements were necessary for deal,
though none were prepared), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 543 (1993).
It is interesting to note that Kaye, Scholer reportedly replaced Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue ("Jones, Day") as Lincoln Savings' examination counsel after Jones, Day advised the
thrift to cooperate with the regulators. See Tim Smart, Jones, Day: Did It Do Its Duty in the
Keating Affair?, Bus. WK., May 4, 1992, at 120; see also Jones, Day's Additional Comments
on its Settlement With the RTC, 2 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Buraff) C-1, C-50 (Apr. 30, 1993).
Jones, Day settled a suit with the Resolution Trust Corporation (the "RTC") for a record-
breaking $51 million. Id. The firm signed an OTS consent decree and one of the attorneys,
William Schilling, a former director of examinations and supervision with the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, was barred from the banking industry and practice before the
OTS. See Jones, Day Cashes Out for $51 Million, 2 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Burafi) 3 (Apr.
30, 1993).
46 See ABA TASK FORCE ExposuRE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 9; O'Malley, supra
note 6, at 4.
47 ABA TASK FORCE ExposuRE DRAr, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 4, 19-23.
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became a client and what purpose the representation serves. One
area of particular danger involves loan transactions. A law firm
working on a loan transaction for a financial institution should
make clear that its representation does not include advice con-
cerning the institution's compliance with regulatory lending limits
or other regulations, if such is the case.48
A law firm should not make the mistake of being lulled into a
false sense of security simply by defining narrowly the scope of its
representation of a particular client. The fact that the scope of
representation covers one area only, may actually expose the law
firm to additional risk because the firm may be unaware of all of
its client's actions. The firm can easily become unconscious of its
increasing role vis-&-vis a particular client and could, in an antag-
onistic situation with the regulators, be imputed to know more
than it is actually aware. A firm should carefully monitor its on-
going relationships with its clients so as not to be inadvertently
drawn into such an expanded scope of representation. It should
be clear on what it is being asked to do in any given case. An
affirmative determination to expand the scope of the representa-
tion of the client should be made if the breadth of legal representa-
tion is broadened.
Whenever a firm has decided to expand the scope of representa-
tion of a client, it should revise its engagement letter to reflect the
expanded scope.49 In addition, extra attention should be paid to
the nature and extent of matters in which the firm is advising the
institution. An aggressive peer review process is particularly
helpful in determining if the "aggregate of knowledge" accumu-
lated through the many relationships raises the liability threshold
of the firm. A detailed list of all matters performed for a client
should be periodically updated and reviewed for conflict of interest
situations and an overly expansive representation.
On the other hand, a law firm which acts as general counsel to a
banking institution is much more likely to be viewed as agent of
that institution. Many of the suits brought against law firms have
included partners who acted as directors, stood to gain monetarily
from various transactions, or acted as general counsel to the insti-
tution. Firms acting as general counsel or regulatory counsel, eas-
48 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 5.
49 See ABA Task Force Exposure Draft, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 24.
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ily viewed as "institution-affiliated parties," remain at the highest
risk according to ALAS. 50
C. Do Not Speak as Your Client's Alter Ego
One of the major criticisms leveled at the attorneys at Kaye,
Scholer was their alleged efforts to position the firm between Lin-
coln Savings and the regulators. According to the regulators, by
precluding the agency from having free access to the thrift, the
firm became a spokesperson for the thrift and stepped into its
shoes, thereby assuming its duty of complete disclosure.
This duty, it is reasoned, arises from the Code of Federal
Regulations:
No savings association or director, officer, agent, employee,
affiliated person, or other person participating in the conduct
of the affairs of such association ... shall knowingly: (1) make
any written or oral statement to the [OTS] ... that is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact or omits to state
a material fact concerning any matter within the jurisdiction
of the [OTS].51
While normally this duty extends only to the institution, it was
argued by the regulators that Kaye, Scholer stepped into the shoes
of Lincoln by positioning itself as the intermediary between the
thrift and the regulators and by determining what information the
regulators did and did not receive.52
Attorneys who appear on behalf of or make submissions for fi-
nancial institution clients should carefully clarify to the regula-
tors that any factual representations are made by the client itself
and that the attorney is merely relaying the communication,
rather than acting as the client's alter ego.53 The lawyer should
also attempt to make a reasonable inquiry concerning any infor-
50 See Insurer Reports Profits Up, S&L Claims Going Down, 1 Bank Law. Liab. Rep.
(Buraff) 3 (May 14, 1992) [hereinafter Insurer Reports Profits Up]; see also O'Malley, supra
note 6, at 4.
51 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(b) (1993); see, e.g., Douglas & Train, supra note 33, at 17;
O'Malley, supra note 6, at 7; Beck & Orey, supra note 4, at 74; Orey, supra note 4, at 81;
Stevens & Thomas, supra note 4, at A6.
52 See Douglas & Train, supra note 33, at 17; O'Malley, supra note 6, at 7; Orey, supra
note 4, at 81; Pitt & Johnson, supra note 9, at 6; see also O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 33, at
4-5 (concerning Formal Opinion 93-375 of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility). Kaye, Scholer argued that it did not position itself between the
regulators and the institution. See Liebold, supra note 7, at 193.
53 See Pitt & Johnson, supra note 9, at 7.
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mation given to the regulators if the attorney has reason to believe
that something is amiss. For example, if the attorney's general
observations, knowledge about the institution, and basic market
inquiries give him reason to doubt information being relayed to
the regulators, he should take it upon himself to make further in-
quiry.54 Prior to making a submission on behalf of the client, the
attorney, whenever possible, should send a draft to the client to
receive verification and assurance that the statements made in
the submission are correct and not misleading. 55
D. Remember the Arena in Which You Act
Peter Fishbein, the principal partner in the Kaye, Scholer case,
was first and foremost a litigator. He viewed the bank examina-
tion process with the eye of a litigator.56 Allegedly, he admitted to
the regulators that he had not read the governing banking regula-
tions prior to representing the S&L in the examination.5 7 In their
view, he had no bank regulatory experience, did not seek advice
from the partners in his firm who specialized in bank regulatory
work, and did not familiarize himself with the regulations of the
new arena in which he found himself.58 Consequently, he alleg-
edly treated the bank audit as litigation and viewed his ethical
and legal obligations to his client as such. The OTS viewed his
ethical responsibilities differently.
According to many commentators, Mr. Fishbein's allegedly con-
tentious method of dealing with the regulators was critical to how
the regulators later viewed Kaye, Scholer's actions. The act of
Fishbein in sending a letter to the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board of San Francisco requesting that all further correspondence
with Lincoln be funnelled through Kaye, Scholer "shocked" the
regulators, who responded by writing back that this request "re-
flects a fundamental misunderstanding of the examination pro-
cess. An examination is not civil litigation discovery .... Unfet-
tered access, including the ability to appear at [a thrift] without
advance notice is essential to the fulfillment of [the regulators']
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Beck & Orey, supra note 4, at 70.
57 See Kaye, Scholer's Big Mistake was to Interfere With Its Own Defense, Top U.S. Law-
yers Suggest, 1 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Buraff) 1, 1-2 (Apr. 23, 1992) [hereinafter Kaye,
Scholer's Big Mistake].
58 Id.
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function."5 9 While there is continued debate whether lawyers
practicing bank regulatory work have or should have a heightened
standard of ethics, it is clear that a knowledge of the normal
method of business of the particular arena in which an attorney is
acting is invaluable in determining what actions will be most ef-
fective with the least risk.
E. Fully Utilize Your Firm's Talent
A firm should also provide checks for partners working in areas
outside their usual area of practice. The creation of a system of
peer review, whereby a partner in each practice area is made
aware of the activities of all partners of the firm in such area, is
recommended. The partner can therefore set the tenor of the
firm's representation of clients and is more likely to be aware of
conflicts of interest. In addition, a partner in each office should be
in charge of monitoring the general activities of all partners for a
particular client.60
No longer should each partner be seen as an island unto him-
self. An "eat what you kill" firm mentality may prove simply too
costly to the firm in general.6 ' A firm should stress the interde-
pendence of each partner to the others and fully encourage the
interaction between partners. This will help to ensure that no one
partner is a "loose cannon" acting unwisely or outside the scope of
his expertise.6 2
59 See Beck & Orey, supra note 4, at 70 (quoting Letter from B.J. Davis, FHLB Director
of Examinations, San Francisco, to Peter Fishbein, partner at Kaye, Scholer) (emphasis
added); see also Orey, supra note 4, at 81.
60 ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 13.
61 See Kaye, Scholer's Big Mistake, supra note 57, at 2.
62 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 6; see also ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra
note 14, pt. VI, at 45-46. It is interesting to note that the Jones, Day settlement with the
OTS:
constitut[ed] the final disposition of all allegations for penalties and non-monetary ad-
ministrative relief that could have been brought by the OTS against the Firm in con-
nection with any aspect of its representation of [six specific thrifts], and no future pro-
ceedings shall be commenced against the Firm with respect to any penalties and non-
monetary administrative claims that could have been alleged by the OTS against the
Firm in connection with the Firm's representation of these insured depository institu-
tions .... The OTS, however, expressly reserve[d] the right to seek any and all non-
monetary administrative relief as to present or former partners, other attorneys or
employees of the firm individually in connection with any aspect of such person's par-
ticipation in the Firm's representation of [the six thrifts].
Id.; see OTS AP No. 93-31 (Apr. 19, 1993) (order to cease and desist for affirmative relief
from Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue), reprinted in 1 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Buraff) C-42, C-47,
48 (Apr. 30, 1993).
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While the "peer review" concept may seem distasteful to many
lawyers at first, it is a critical function. The fact that the actions
of one partner may be imputed to the whole firm and potentially
involve risk to the private assets of each and every partner should
serve to temper any distaste one might have concerning the re-
view of one's partners. In addition, if partners are encouraged to
utilize and seek out the expertise of the firm whenever they have a
specific issue, the interdependence will be viewed in a positive,
community light, rather than as a policing function. As one com-
mentator states: "[C]ross-selling . . . services-partners in one
practice group introducing their clients to partners in other prac-
tice groups. It's a good way to build business. But it may also be a
good way to head off a professional liability suit. It's something
Kaye, Scholer conspicuously did not do at Lincoln."63
F. Review Your Document Retention Policy
In many instances, the receiver of a failed institution has been
able to waive the attorney-client privilege of the institution and
has had full access to law firm files related to the representation
of the financial institution. ALAS, noting that the case against
Kaye, Scholer was based in part on internal documents, suggests
revision of firm document retention policies and advises that at-
torneys should avoid keeping handwritten notes, which often are
misconstrued or taken out of context.64
G. Avoid the Appearance of Conflicts of Interest
A law firm should seriously consider prohibiting or severely re-
stricting the appointment of any of its partners to directorships of
financial institutions. ALAS considers a partner in a law firm
representing the institution also acting as a director of a financial
institution to be a high risk activity. 5 In the event that a law firm
continues to allow firm partners to sit as outside directors of fi-
nancial institutions, the firm, at a minimum, should require that
the financial institution be healthy and should continue to moni-
tor the health of the institution as long as the partner remains a
63 See Orey, supra note 4, at 3.
64 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 6.
65 See Insurer Reports Profits Up, supra note 50, at 3; O'Malley, supra note 6, at 4; see
also ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 5.
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director.66 Attention should be paid to the nature and extent of the
relationships between partners in the firm and matters in which
the firm is advising the institution. An aggressive peer review
process is particularly helpful in determining if the "aggregate of
knowledge" accumulated through the many relationships raises
the liability threshold of the firm.
Even the mere appearance of potential conflicts of interest is
highly risky. A law firm should not obtain credit from a financial
institution or invest in a transaction which involves such a cli-
ent.6 7 ALAS considers the "worst scenario" when a law firm repre-
sents both the borrower and the lender in a transaction and the
borrower defaults. An additional danger is presented when the
borrower is a client of a firm and the firm is acting as the lender's
counsel.68 A law firm should have a system for identifying such
client conflicts.
The fact that a law firm's partner is sitting on a financial insti-
tution's board of directors while the firm represents a client in ne-
gotiating a workout of a troubled credit is another scenario raising
serious conflict issues. The firm and the partner-director should
consider the nature and necessity of the partner-director's disclo-
sure of the "interest" involved. The partner should consider recus-
ing himself from participation in the board's discussion of the par-
ticular matter. On the other hand, the regulators may consider
the "sitting out" of the partner-director to be depriving the institu-
tion of a valuable resource. Should the financial institution fail,
the firm and the partner-director can expect to be carefully
scrutinized.
Even the simultaneous representation of both a financial insti-
tution and its holding company may be risky. The OTS has
warned against such representation.69 Indeed, some of the criti-
66 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 4.
67 See id. at 5; ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFr, supra note 14, pt. VI, at 27.
68 See O'Malley, supra note 6, at 5; see also ABA TASK FORCE ExPosuRE DRAFr, supra
note 14, pt. VI (further suggestions).
69 See OTS AP No. 93-31, 11 (Apr. 19, 1993) (order to cease and desist for affirmative
relief from Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue); see also ABA TASK FORCE ExposURE DRAFr, supra
note 13, pt. VI, at 30; Release, OTS AP No. 93-29, 1-3 (with attachments) (April 15, 1993).
Indeed, in April of 1993, the OTS began "testing" a new draft of an attorney letter to be
used in conjunction with thrift examinations, which involved a heightened level of disclo-
sure and an attempt to involve law firms in "policing" the thrifts. The attorney letter re-
quired that the law firm disclose those instances where it had provided legal services in-
volving potential conflicts of interest. It also required the firm to certify that whenever it
dealt with a question involving the thrift's compliance with law, rules or regulations, re-
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cisms leveled against Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue ("Jones Day") in
its settled case centered upon the allegation that there was a con-
flict of interest in Jones, Day's representation of both ACC and its
subsidiary, Lincoln. The OTS alleged that Jones, Day violated its
fiduciary duties to Lincoln in part because it did not inform the
directors of Lincoln of the problems which it had uncovered, but
rather informed the general counsel of ACC, and ACC was con-
trolled by those perpetrating the fraud.7 0 This conflicts problem
can and should be addressed in the engagement letter by disclos-
ing the potential for such conflicts inherent in the situation and
mapping out a procedure for their resolution. Both the client and
its holding company should agree to the terms of such anticipated
resolutions.
CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen which of the new theories of lawyer liabil-
ity will become established law and which will remain part of the
lore of law firm bank regulatory practice. However, regardless of
the outcome of the debate among those in various areas of the
legal profession concerning such theories, the increased exposure
of firms with financial institution clients, is likely to be perceived
for some time to come. However, as the preceding section noted, a
firm can minimize its exposure through modification of some of its
internal policies and procedures. That change in the internal
practices of a law firm may be the most substantial legacy of what
may become known as the "Kaye, Scholer Asset Freeze Scare."
quirements regarding fiduciary responsibility, or principals of safety and soundness and it
concluded that the client should evaluate the matter in light of the question involved, the
firm would so advise the client and would consider applicable rules of professional conduct.
The letter is currently in the final stages of approval for nationwide use and is expected to
be virtually identical to the tested draft letter.
70 See Schilling and Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, OTS AP No. 93-31 (Apr. 19, 1993) (or-
der), reprinted in 2 Bank Law. Liab. Rep. (Burafi) C-1, C-34, 35 (April 23, 1993); see also
Smart, supra note 45, at 120.
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